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STEWART

A.

BAKER*

After the NAFTA
Luckily, in a short conclusion like this, I cannot be expected to say anything
about the text of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that has
not already been said by the contributors to this remarkable symposium. Instead,
I will undertake the more hazardous task of trying to predict the NAFTA's future.
Despite the buyer's remorse now on display in each of the countries that signed
the NAFTA (I write in April 1993), it seems likely that the NAFTA will be
implemented more or less as signed. There will be side deals and separate legislation relating to issues of concern to labor and environmentalists, but these should
not interfere with implementation of the agreement. Rather, they will be what
Mary Poppins called "the spoonful of sugar that makes the medicine go down."
But what then? What issues will dominate the NAFTA once it is in place? Here
are my candidates.
I. NAFTA as a Trading Bloc
It has become fashionable to speak of the emergence of three trading blocsthe European Communities (EC), centered on Germany, the NAFTA, centered
on the United States, and a vaguely defined Asian bloc centered on Japan. In fact,
however, only the EC comes close to being a genuine trading bloc. EC Member
States have agreed to conduct a common trade policy, enforced by common tariffs,
common antidumping remedies, Communitywide subsidies, and the like. And the
EC's bureaucracy has used the leverage of this common trade policy to extend
the influence of European standards and policies from the Arctic Circle to Africa
and beyond, via a web of concessionary trade arrangements. The EC, in short,
does indeed have the makings of a trade bloc.
The other two supposed blocs are nothing of the sort. Applying the notion to
Asia is silly. Japan has certainly increased its trade dramatically with other Asian
*The author, a long-standing member of the international trade bar in Washington, D.C., is
currently the General Counsel of the National Security Agency.
The following remarks are entirely personal to the author and do not reflect the views of the United
States Government, the Defense Department, or the National Security Agency.
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countries, but increased trade has yet to bring a sense of common interest, let
alone a coordinated effort to limit non-Asian trade. Quite the contrary. Most
countries in Asia would probably be delighted to trade a bit less with Japan and
a bit more with the United States and the EC.
The NAFTA falls between the Asian and the European models. There is no
doubt that the NAFTA will encourage greater trade within North America, and
some of the expansion may well come at the expense of countries outside North
America. But this effect is likely to be modest overall, and it will be largely
mitigated by the single most important economic fact about the NAFTA. Unlike
the EC, which is a merger of several more-or-less equal partners (plus a batch
of smaller players), the NAFTA is an agreement between one enormous economy
and two small-to-medium-sized ones. Economically, Canada is about a tenth
the size of the United States, while Mexico is about a twenty-fifth. Increasing
globalization of industry has brought home to countries such as Canada and
Mexico the extraordinary cost of trying to maintain anything like a self-sufficient
economy. They must specialize in order to remain competitive. The appeal of the
NAFTA is that it makes specialization safer while forcing its pace. Since signing
its free trade pact with the United States, Canada has already lost many of the
branch plants that once existed to take advantage of high tariff walls. Mexico's
monuments to autarky are following suit.
The pressure to specialize has been less severe in this country. While American
companies have felt the hot breath of global competition, and many have failed,
there are few global industries that do not have at least one competitive American
member.
Merging a single full-service economy with two somewhat more specialized
economies works against the emergence of a European-style trade bloc. If the
Canadian and Mexican economies continue to concentrate more and more
heavily on industries where they have a comparative advantage, their other,
less efficient, industries will become less important and may even disappear
entirely. If so, those governments will have little or no interest in continuing
to provide tariff or other protection for the vanished industry. If, for example,
U.S. widget manufacturers were to wipe out the widget-makers of Mexico or
Canada, those countries would be tempted to reduce their widget tariffs to
zero. Canadian and Mexican consumers would then obtain the benefits of
a bare-knuckles competition between U.S. and Japanese widget companies;
neither U.S. nor Japanese manufacturers would have a tariff advantage. Not
much of a "trade bloc" there.
Even if the Canadian and Mexican Governments do not eliminate widget tariffs
simply to aid consumers, they can use widget tariffs as a bargaining chip in
negotiations. The Canadian Government might, for example, be tempted to eliminate widget tariffs in exchange for an integrated Japanese company agreeing to
turn widgets into downstream products at a new factory in Canada.
Such bargaining would not be possible if the NAFTA were a customs union
VOL. 27, NO. 3
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in which all parties must maintain common tariff levels. But in a free trade
agreement each party retains control over its own tariffs. The drafters of the
NAFTA made some effort to deal with this issue. Under annex 308.1, each party
agreed to reduce the most-favored-nation duty on automatic data processing
equipment to a single common rate. Once an import has paid that duty to any
country, it may travel freely throughout the continent. The parties also agreed
that, for data processing goods (and for color TV tubes), the duty charged by
any one party will be considered a matter of legitimate interest to the others;
the external rates that each applies to the rest of the world will not be changed
without consultation. These limited provisions were obtained by a few savvy
industries seeking to obtain the benefits of a customs union and to reduce the
incentives for tariff gamesmanship. The effort may succeed for those industries,
although the opportunities for seeking tactical advantages have not been entirely
eliminated.
Other U.S. industries, however, will sooner or later be heard to complain that
Mexico or Canada are striking bargains with countries outside North America
that eliminate the advantages of the NAFTA for U.S. manufacturers. The United
States will rarely be able to play the same game, since it will almost always have
one domestic manufacturer seeking continued tariff protection. Nor is it likely
that the United States and its partners will turn the NAFTA into a customs union,
particularly if the smaller partners can get many of the benefits of U.S. tariffs
without the disadvantages. While this dynamic will thus be a source of continuing
low-level conflict in the NAFTA, it should give considerable comfort to those
who fear the emergence of a North American trade bloc.
H. Will the NAFTA Be Expanded?
Another issue likely to recur with frequency for the parties to the NAFTA is
whether to expand the agreement beyond its current three members. Although
the Bush administration was contemplating additional agreements, the Clinton
administration's enthusiasm for expanding the NAFTA may be more restrained;
concerns raised during the NAFTA debate about Mexico's environmental and
labor policies have equal force elsewhere in Latin America. The other NAFTA
members may also be slow to open the club to additional countries. Mexico may
doubt the value of having to compete for U.S. and Canadian consumers with
countries whose economies mirror its own. And Canada was unenthusiastic even
about expanding the two-nation U.S.-Canada deal to include Mexico.
Canada joined the NAFTA talks principally to avoid a "hub and spoke" relationship with the United States-one in which the United States had free trade agreements
with its neighbors while neither had free trade deals with the other. Ironically, the
NAFTA has not eliminated the possibility of such "hub and spoke" arrangements.
Quite the contrary, now there are three possible hubs. Any of the three NAFTA
countries could choose to begin free trade negotiations with a fourth country. The
FALL 1993
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proliferation of such side deals, like the risk of selective tariffs cuts by more specialized members of the NAFTA, could be a potential source of tension within the
NAFTA, particularly in connection with rules of origin and similar matters.
Once again, the NAFTA addressed this issue, but sketchily. It provided in
article 2205 that other countries may join the NAFTA only on terms and conditions
agreed by all three current members. This provision, of course, simply begs the
question of separate agreements.
Right now, Mexico seems the most likely to become a hub of its own. It has
deals signed or in negotiations with Chile, Venezuela, and Costa Rica; the rest
of Central America is on deck. The United States may open negotiations with
Chile or Argentina, and it already has a free trade deal with Israel. Even the
Canadian Government may decide there are few risks to itself in free trade arrangements with selected Latin American or Caribbean countries. The result could be
an unwieldy patchwork of special deals, as each NAFTA member seeks individual.
advantages from separate free trade negotiations.
Ill. Governance and Sovereignty
The remarkable strides made by Mexico in the past ten years in such areas
as democratization and elimination of corruption have quieted traditional U.S.
worries about Mexico's governmental institutions. But concerns linger. One senior U.S. legislator is reported to have asked, "How can you have free trade with
a country that is not free?"
While some of Mexico's electoral practices may not differ much from practices
current during living memory in, say, Chicago, the fact remains that Canada and
the United States have political traditions far different from Mexico's. There may
well be some missteps as democratization proceeds in Mexico, and these could
trigger a profound reaction north of the border.
Indeed, even without missteps, standards of conduct for government officials
will be a likely source of continuing controversy. In one recent example, U.S.
drug enforcement agents concluded that cooperation between Mexican officials
and drug smugglers had resulted in the death of a DEA agent. Not long after,
U.S. agents winked when a suspect in the murder was forcibly abducted from
Mexico; and the U.S. Government persuaded the United States Supreme Court
to declare such abductions consistent with U.S. law and treaty obligations. In
Mexico, the resulting uproar took a form that had become surprisingly rare of
late-charges of a resurgent Yankee threat to Mexican sovereignty.
While the Clinton administration has promised not to repeat the abduction
episode, sovereignty will be a continuing feature of political debates over the
NAFTA in all three countries. Historically, one consequence of sharing the continent with a world power was that both Canada and Mexico defined themselves
in large part by emphatic differences with the United States. Attacking the United
States as a threat to national sovereignty has been a staple of domestic politics in
VOL. 27, NO. 3
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Canada and Mexico for years. The leaders who made the NAFTA possible took
advantage of a unique hiatus in "sovereignty politics." But such politics are far
from dead. We can expect to see many disputes cast in precisely those terms as
economic convergence begins to affect other aspects of political life.
Nor will the United States be free from sovereignty politics. Twenty years ago,
a House Ways and Means Committee member was reported to have rebutted a
witness's invocation of international trade law with the immortal words, "GATT,
schmatt. This is America." This attitude lives on, even though the United States
no longer has the economic clout to simply ignore international trade law. Sooner
or later, the NAFTA will spring an unpleasant surprise on powerful U.S. interests.
The disappointed industry, its workers, and their congressmen will then be vocal
in condemning the loss of U.S. sovereignty.
IV. Environmental Issues
Perhaps the most likely substantive flash point for bitter sovereignty debates
may be environmental protection. American environmental groups are powerful
and they are not used to being thwarted by international law. U.S. environmental
groups have invoked U.S. sovereignty in attacking the NAFTA, and their appeals
have been matched in Mexican circles by charges of "eco-imperialism."
Environmentalists have already begun to express extreme concern about the
prospect of de jure and de facto harmonization of North American environmental
standards at levels below those currently prevailing in the United States. Since
economic integration seems likely to foster harmonization, U.S. environmental
groups will find themselves constantly pressing Mexico for higher standards,
more aggressive enforcement, and faster progress.
Properly managed, this conflict is unlikely to shake the NAFTA's foundation.
Mexico has the same interest as the rest of North America in a clean environment.
What Mexico often lacks are the funds to carry out environmental initiatives. The
most obvious compromise in disputes about environmental sovereignty is an
agreement to protect the Mexican environment using funds provided by the United
States and Canada.
Faced with much the same kind of issues, the EC has instituted large-scale
income transfers from rich to poor members. This is a likely model for the
NAFTA. The EC has shown that disputes about sovereignty become less emotional and more easily resolved if they are transformed into debates about the size
and purposes of north-south transfer payments.
V. Dispute Resolution
The last likely point of friction is dispute resolution. Perhaps this is obvious.
Almost by definition, dispute resolution produces surprise and disappointment
for one side or the other. But the outrage of the loser will surely be heightened
by the way dispute resolution panels are structured under the NAFTA. For underFALL 1993
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standable reasons, the United States did not want disputes settled by three-person
panels with one member chosen by each of the three governments. Ganging up
on the United States would have been too tempting. The solution was to have the
swing vote on each panel chosen essentially by lot.
That is fine as long as the stakes are low and the panels unanimous. But what
happens when a country loses an important dispute that it thinks it should have
won, simply because its adversary was able to choose the deciding panel member?
A decision seen as having been determined by the toss of a coin will not get much
deference. The lottery aspect of the dispute resolution process will probably spark
a handful of bitter controversies among the NAFTA's members over the next
decade.
VI. Conclusion
I do not mean to paint a cavalcade of disaster for the NAFTA. Quite the reverse.
It is important to remember in the euphoria of ratification that the NAFTA will
not end trade tensions in North America. But overall, the tensions I foresee are
entirely manageable. The vital fact about the NAFTA, and the best reason to
support it, is that it provides a framework for resolving those tensions in favor
of trade that is more free, not less.
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